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Abstract 
There have been substantial increases in liquidity in recent years and real oil prices 
have almost returned to the high levels achieved before the Global financial crisis. 
Unanticipated increases in global real M2 lead to statistically significant increases in 
real oil prices. The cumulative impact of global real M2 on the real price of crude oil 
is important in the recovery of oil price over 2009 to 2011.  
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Why are crude oil prices high when global activity is weak? 
1.Introduction 
Given that global liquidity has risen substantially in recent years the question arises of 
whether there has been spill-over from liquidity to crude oil prices. The substantial increase 
in nominal M2 for the largest four economies from 13,500 billion U.S. dollars in 1997 to 
45,000 billion U.S. dollars in 2011 is illustrated in Figure 1. In Figure 1 spot prices per barrel 
of West Texas Intermediate crude oil (WTI) are $58.14 in January 2007 and $140 in June 
2008. The spot price for WTI falls to $41.68 in January 2009 and rebounds to $133.93 in 
April 2011. 
Belke et al. (2010) show that global liquidity has risen sharply since 2001 and find 
significant impacts on an OECD commodity price index (dominated by oil with a weight of 
63%). Anzuini et al. (2012) find support for a significant (but small) effect of U.S. monetary 
policy on oil prices over 1970-2008. 
1
 
In this paper we seek to determine the influence of structural oil price shocks and 
liquidity as it arises from the major economies on the price of crude oil. A structural VAR 
model is employed in the analysis.  
2. Methodology 
Consider a structural vector autoregression model (SVAR) constructed with monthly 
data from 1997:1 to 2011:12, with the following variables: global oil production     , real 
aggregate demand      , real oil prices      , and global real M2 in U.S. dollars 
        .
2
 Global M2 is constructed by aggregating M2 in U.S. dollars of the Eurozone, 
U.S., China and Japan. Monthly data for China are available from 1997:1.       ,       and  
                                                          
1
 Glick and Leduc (2012) do not find evidence of an effect of recent U.S. monetary policy shocks (specifically 
quantitative easing) on commodity prices. 
2
 The variables: oil prices and global M2 are deflated by the United States (U.S.) consumer price index (CPI). 
The M2 in the four biggest economies (accounting for 65% of the world economy in 2011) is used as a proxy 
for global liquidity.   
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         are first different stationary variables.
3
 Real aggregate demand is measured by the 
index of global real economic activity constructed by Kilian (2009) based on equal-weighted 
dry cargo freight rates.     is stationary. 
The SVAR model can expressed as:  
                               ∑       
 
        ,          (1)                          
where three lags are determined by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and t  denotes 
the vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural innovations. The vector     can be 
expressed as     [                                    ] . Model restrictions are 
based on Killian (2009), to the extent possible, given the inclusion in our model of the global 
M2. The identification restrictions on      are imposed as follows: 
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3. Empirical results 
3.1. Impulse response function results 
Figure 2 shows the responses of the variables in the SVAR to one-standard deviation 
structural innovations. In the first column are shown the responses of global oil production, 
global real aggregate demand, global real price of oil and global real M2 to a structural 
(positive) innovation in global oil production. The effect of an unanticipated supply 
disruption on global oil production is very persistent and highly significant. An unanticipated 
negative innovation in global oil production does not cause a significant effect on the real 
price of oil, but does cause a significant negative effect on global real aggregate demand. A 
disruption to global oil production causes decline in Global real M2 that is significant in the 
second and third months. 
                                                          
3
 As indicated by the Augmented Dickey Fuller and confirmed by the Dickey Fuller GLS, the Phillip-Perron  
and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin. 
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In the second column of Figure 2 a positive global real aggregate demand shock has a 
persistent positive effect on global oil production that is statistically significant between the 
third and eleventh months. An unanticipated global real aggregate demand expansion has a 
significant effect on global real aggregate demand that rises over time. A positive global real 
activity shock has a positive effect on real oil prices that is statistically significant for about 
five months. A positive shock to global real activity does not significantly affect global real 
M2.  
 The effects of an oil market–specific demand shock are shown in column 3 of Figure 
2. In the third row of column 3 a positive shock in oil market-specific demand has a large and 
persistent positive effect on the real price of oil. This effect is highly statistically significant 
and rises in magnitude over the first three months. An oil market–specific demand shock is 
associated with significant effects on global oil production and significant increases in global 
real aggregate demand. A positive oil market–specific demand shock increases global real 
M2 in the first months.  
In the fourth column are shown the responses of the variables to structural innovations 
in Global real M2. In response to an unanticipated increase in Global real M2 there are 
significant and persistent increases in global oil production and in global real aggregate 
demand. After a positive shock to global real M2, an increase in global oil production builds 
up over the first five months and is statistically significant after the third month. The rise in 
global real aggregate demand is statistically significant over all twenty months. The increase 
in real oil prices is statistically significant between the fifth and ninth months.  
In summary, global real M2 has statistically significant effects on real oil prices, 
global aggregate demand and global oil production. Many of the other results over 1997:01-
2011:12 in Figure 3 are comparable and similar to those found by Kilian (2009) for 1973:1-
2007:12. Brief mention will be made of findings that are different. Over 1997:01-2011:12 an 
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unanticipated negative innovation in global oil production causes a significant negative effect 
on global real aggregate demand, whereas over 1973:1-2007:12 the result is at best 
marginally significant. A positive oil market–specific demand shock has a positive significant 
effect (at one standard error confidence bands after the second month) on global oil 
production over 1997:01-2011:12, but not over 1973:1-2007:12. 
3.2. Historical decomposition of real oil price 
The cumulative contribution to the real price of oil of the structural shocks to global 
oil production, global real aggregate demand, oil-specific demand and global real M2 are 
reported in Figure 3, from estimating the SVAR model in equation (4). Striking facts from 
Figure 3 are that the cumulative contribution to real oil price of shocks to global oil 
production are comparatively small, of shocks to oil-specific demand are comparatively 
large, and the contribution to real oil prices of shocks to global real aggregate demand and 
global real M2 are of intermediate and comparable size.  
The early part of the period in Figure 3 reflects the recovery from the Asian financial 
crisis and world petroleum consumption returning to strong growth in 1999 and then the 
onset of recession in the U.S. beginning in March of 2001. In Figure 3 the rapid increase in 
oil price leading to a peak in June 2008 is associated with positive global real activity, low 
spare production capacity, and positive structural shocks to global real M2.
4
 The fall in oil 
price from July 2008 to January 2009 is associated with the global financial crisis during late 
2008, recession in the U.S. over December 2007 to June 2009, and weak growth in Europe. 
This is reflected in Figure 3 in that the cumulative contribution of structural shocks to global 
                                                          
4
 On the production side, Hamilton (2011) notes the cumulative contribution of shocks to real oil price is related 
to a number of factors. A general strike in Venezuela reduced oil production at the end of 2002 and the 
beginning of 2003, and that the U.S. attack on Iraq starting in March 2003 further reduced oil production. 
Additional factors contributing to stagnation of oil production over 2002-2008 includes instability in places like 
Iraq and Nigeria, a fall in production from the North Sea and from fields in Mexico and Indonesia, and that 
Saudi production was lower in 2007 than in 2005. During 2011 oil production is disrupted in Libya and there is 
political turmoil in several Middle Eastern countries. Hamilton (2009) shows that the large oil price increases 
during 2007 and 2008 were due to strong global demand for oil. 
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real aggregate demand turn negative in mid-2008 and early 2009. OPEC decreases 
production target from September 2008 to January 2009. The contribution to real oil price of 
oil-market specific precautionary demand is also very small or negative at the end of 2008 
and beginning of 2009. 
The cumulative impact of global real M2 on the real price of crude oil is substantial in 
the recovery of oil price during 2009 and 2010. Cumulative effects of positive structural 
shocks to global real aggregate demand contribute to the rise in oil price from January 2009 
through April 2011 only through the latter half of the period. Oil specific precautionary 
demand made a cumulative contribution to real oil prices at the end of 2009 and during 
2011.
5
 
4. Discussion and Conclusion  
There have been substantial increases in liquidity in recent years and real oil prices 
have returned to high levels following the Global financial crisis. Unanticipated increases in 
global real M2 lead to statistically significant increases in real oil prices. The cumulative 
contributions of shocks to global real aggregate demand and to global real M2 to real oil 
prices 1997:01-2011:12 are of comparable size. The cumulative impact of global real M2 on 
the real price of crude oil is important in the recovery of oil price during 2009 and 2010.  
Barsky and Kilian (2002) argue that change in monetary policy regimes was a key 
factor behind the oil price increases of the 1970s and show that the substantial increase in 
industrial commodity prices that preceded the increase in oil prices in 1973-1974 is consistent 
with the view that rising demand based on increased global liquidity drove oil prices higher. 
Alquist et al. (2012) confirm the Gillman and Nakov (2009) findings that monetary factors 
                                                          
5
 Our results are robust to different lag structure, alternative monetary aggregates and when different indicator 
for aggregate demand is used. Results are similar in magnitude and statistical significance with lag structures 
between three to eighteen in the SVAR model (with standard errors becoming larger due to reduction of degrees 
of freedom). Results are robust to use of global M1 or global M3 instead of global M2 as monetary aggregate 
and when OECD country industrial production (reported by OECD) replaces Kilian’s measure of global 
aggregate demand. 
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Granger cause oil prices in the post-war period up until 1997. The issue is whether there is a 
liquidity effect on oil prices in the last few years. It is likely that the real oil price rise is due 
to real factors for which real M2 (M1 or M3) is a proxy.  
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Figure 1. Log of real global liquidity vs. log of real oil price
Notes: Global M2 is taken to be the sum in U.S. dollars of the M2 in the U.S., Eurozone, Japan and China. The 
price of oil is WTI. Real values are obtained by dividing nominal by the U.S. CPI.  
Figure 2. The impulse response effects of the structural shocks: 1997:01-2011:12 
 
 
 
 
Notes: GO is global oil production, AD is global demand for commodities (from Kilian (2009), RP is real oil price, 
GLOBM2 is real M2 of U.S., Eurozone, Japan and China. The dashed lines represent one and two standard error confidence 
bands around the estimates of the coefficients of the impulse response functions. The confidence bands are obtained using 
Monte Carlo integration as described by Sims (1980), where 5000 draws were used from the asymptotic distribution of the 
VAR coefficient. 
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Figure 3. Cumulative effect of structural shocks on real price of oil 
 
 
 
 
Notes: GO is global oil production, AD is global demand for commodities (from Kilian (2009), RP is real oil 
price, GLOBM2 is real M2 of U.S., Eurozone, Japan and China. 
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